Abstract. We present a framework for extending the functionality of LDAP servers from their typical use as a public directory in public key infrastructures. In this framework the LDAP servers are used for administrating infrastructure processes. One application of this framework is a method for providing proof-of-possession, especially in the case of encryption keys. Another one is the secure delivery of software personal security environments.
Introduction
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides practical use of public key cryptography proposed by Diffie and Hellmann [DH76] . Entities register for the services of the PKI in order for them to achieve security goals like authenticity and confidentiality using digital signatures and encryption. One of the most typical products of a PKI are digital certificates. They bind a public key to an entity which owns 3 the corresponding private key. Commonly met certificates follow the X.509 [X.509] and the RFC 3280 [HPFS02] standards. A PKI is usually composed of two components namely the Registration Authority (RA) and the Certification Authority (CA).
The task of the RA is to register an end-entity in the PKI by examining its credentials. This entity may either already possess a key pair or not. In the first case, the public key is provided by the entity to the RA during registration and forwarded to the CA that issues the certificate. In the second case, the key pair is produced by the CA and, together with the issued certificate, delivered to the entity. In either case, the CA has to guarantee that finally the certificate is issued for the entity that owns the corresponding private key.
The problem that arises in the first case is for the CA to determine whether this entity does really own the corresponding private key or not. Therefore, the entity must provide a Proof-of-Possession (PoP) for this private key. In several certification request syntaxes special fields are reserved for this purpose. An important issue with PoP is the number of messages needed for accomplishing it. While for signature keys the straightforward solution is to provide a signature during registration, the situation is not so easy for encryption keys. One good solution in terms of number of messages is the indirect scheme where the issued certificate is encrypted with the included public key and thus can only be read by the intended recipient. We provide an easy and efficient variant of this scheme using a directory based on the lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) [HM02] . Furthermore, it can be extended to tightly link the PoP to the registration procedure. Moreover, a successful PoP is necessary for activation of the certificate. Whether or when this activation will take place is under full control of the entity.
In the second case, the problem is to securely deliver the private key to the registered and identified entity. A commonly used standard for software personal security environments (PSE) is PKCS#12 [PKCS12] . Usually, such PSEs are either handed out face to face or sent by e-mail. For automated certification processes in which management should be simple, the solution of physical presence can not be used since it hampers the automated process and requires human administration. Sending the PKCS#12 file by e-mail is secure since PKCS#12 has mechanisms to ensure privacy and integrity. Nevertheless, the e-mail may be intercepted by a third party which can try to extract the keys (in a password protected PKCS#12 file this may be easy for a weak password). Moreover, the e-mail may never reach his recipient due to an incorrectly configured spam filter or even a mailbox which has reach its capacity limit. We suggest a scheme based on an LDAP directory to ensure that only the legitimate recipient will receive his PSE without any eavesdropping from a third party. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss specifications on certification request messages and examine their proposals for achieving PoP. In Section 3, we describe our proposed schemes and argue on their usability. Lastly, in Section 4 we conclude the paper and discuss future work in this direction.
Certification Request Messages and PoP
Common practice for the registration of end-entities in a PKI environment are special certification request message syntaxes. Several specifications address this problem.
The most commonly used one is the PKCS#10 [PKCS10] . It defines a syntax in which entities can provide information needed for creating a certificate from the CA. Furthermore, it enables them to include other data that can be used during and after the certification process. This syntax requires the message to be secured with a digital signature. Among other purposes, this is done to provide a PoP for the corresponding private key, since the signature can be verified from the receiving party (RA or CA). However, this syntax does not consider keys used for encryption only. Such keys might have to be treated differently due to limitations of the cryptosystem or different security requirements.
Another specification is the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [MASK99] . While handling signature keys identically to PKCS#10, it provides three methods for PoP of encryption keys. The first is to reveal the private key to the CA. The second one, called direct method, requires exchange of challengeresponse messages and thus needs extra messages. The third one, the indirect method, is to encrypt the issued certificate with the contained public key and have the end-entity to send the decrypted certificate back in a confirmation message and by this demonstrate ownership of the corresponding private key.
Similar proposals can be found in Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) [AF99] . Special care about encryption keys is taken also in Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC) [MLSW00] . CMC specifies a mechanism for PoP which requires more than a single-round trip 4 and therefore complicates the process. Lastly, XKMS [XKMS] considers the PoP problem exclusively for signature keys. For a discussion on PoP see also [ANL03] .
The above proposals do not provide satisfactory solutions in cases where the end-entity does not want to reveal its key or the certification process management should be kept minimal and simple.
We believe that PoP is of great importance in the case of encryption keys. A certificate containing a public key for which the corresponding private key is not owned by the intended end-entity or does not exist at all is actually unusable. Any message encrypted with this public key can not be decrypted by the end-entity. This scenario can become extremely dangerous in cases where the original message is destroyed 5 and only the encrypted message exists. Therefore, no one should be able to use a certificate containing encryption keys without prior acknowledgement of its owner.
To solve the PoP problem we propose a scheme similar to the indirect method described above, in which an end-entity is an authenticated user of an LDAP directory, which he can download and activate his certificate from. But in order to do so, he must decrypt a secret (implicit use of his private key), decrypt the certificate and then put it back on the LDAP server. Thus, we can avoid extra confirmation messages to the CA.
The New Schemes

LDAP basics
LDAP is a protocol for providing access to directories based on the X.500 specification [X.500]. The current version is LDAPv3 specified in [HM02] . Internet directories speaking LDAP are most commonly used in PKIs for dissemination of public information. It is exactly this "public directory" mentioned in [DH76] when public key cryptography was discovered. LDAP directories serve as the place where clients can download certificates of other users in order to send encrypted messages or verify digital signatures. In addition they can be informed with the latest certificate revocation information by downloading a certificate revocation list (CRL) from the directory. Therefore, almost all PKIs support LDAP and no significant rearrangements should be done from their side to use an LDAP directory for managing processes in their environments.
Apart from the fact that LDAP is already supported by PKIs, it has also attractive security features. It provides simple authentication of users with a password 6 . In addition, it supports the simple authentication and security layer (SASL) [Mey97] as illustrated in [WAHM00] . Lastly, it can be combined with TLS [DA99] as described in [HMW00] . The communication over TLS guarantees privacy and integrity of the data exchanged between an LDAP directory and a client. The password authentication can be used in combination with TLS to avoid that the password is transmitted in clear. For a thorough study on the security of directories see [Cha00] .
Providing PoP with LDAP
We present the scheme for providing PoP for encryption keys using an LDAP directory.
In this scheme the CA is accepting a certification request for encryption keys. At this point the CA assumes that the private key exists and issues the certificate. After that, it creates an entry on the LDAP directory as usual. One difference is that the certificate is encrypted with the public key it contains and stored in the attribute encryptedUserCertificate (see Appendix A). Secondly, the CA randomly chooses an LDAP user password. Its hashed value is placed in the entry's attribute userPassword for the simple authentication procedure of the LDAP. It also encrypts the password using the entity's public key and puts it in the special attribute encryptedUserPassword. At this point even the user itself does not know his password, since only its hash value and an encrypted version is found on the directory.
We have introduced a new object class called pkiUserManagement (see Appendix A) which can hold the above described attributes. Figure 1 shows an example of such an LDAP entry along with its attributes.
The end-entity, that owns the corresponding private key, does the following: First, it downloads the encrypted password and certificate and decrypts them with its private key. Now it can use the password to bind to the directory as an authenticated user and write the decrypted certificate in its entry. With this the PoP is completed and, simultaneously, the certificate is activated enabling other entities to use it. On the contrary, for an end-entity that does not own the private key, both the certificate and the password will remain encrypted in the directory and cannot be used. Clearly, the communication between the authenticated user and the LDAP server must be secured with SASL or TLS to avoid transmitting the password in clear.
One step that the CA must perform is to force the LDAP directory, by proper access control lists (ACLs), to accept write requests only for authenticated users and only for the userCertificate attribute of their own entry. This enforces that exclusively authenticated users can place their certificate only on their own entry in the directory. In addition, these ACLs must be configured in such a way that the user password (although hashed) is not visible to other users. This will eliminate the possibility of dictionary attacks on the password performed from any end-user.
An optional variant of this scheme, which can link both identity and PoP information more tightly together, is the following: The encrypted password (when decrypted) is only the half of the real password 7 used by the user to authenticate to the LDAP directory. The other half of the password is provided to the user during registration. This half works as a shared-secret between the CA and the end-user. The user, in order to authenticate to the directory, has to combine the two passwords.
A third variant is to have the shared-secret function as the (complete) password for the user to authenticate to the directory. PoP will follow with decryption Table. of the certificate without having to decrypt the password too. Nevertheless, in this case the ability to authenticate to the directory is disconnected from PoP. CAs can realise this scheme differently based on their policies. For example, if after three days the certificate is still encrypted in the directory, the user is deleted from the directory leaving him no ability to use this certificate. Alternatively, after decryption of the certificate the user password is deleted in order for the user to be unable to authenticate to the directory.
Methods overview
We discuss the characteristics and properties of the certification request messages presented in Section 2 and our proposed LDAP based solution. PKCS#10 and XKMS do not support PoP for encryption keys (Encryption Key Support, EKS) and we will not discuss them further in this section. CMC and the LDAP based proposal specify only one possible method to provide PoP, while CRMF and CMP offer three different ones (Different Methods, DM). Nevertheless, the last ones propose revealing the private key (Private Key Revealing, PKR) as a solution. Furthermore, CMC requires more than a single-round trip where all other methods do not. But CMP and CRMF require that a confirmation message should be sent to the CA. Our proposed method does not require those (Single Round Trip, SRT). In table 1 we can see an overview of these characteristics.
Secure delivery of software PSEs with LDAP
A variation of the above scheme can be used for delivering software PSEs (usually in the PKCS#12 format). In this scenario the PKCS#12 structure is placed in the userPKCS12 [Smi00] attribute of the LDAP entry. The connections done to the directory must be secured with TLS. If a user can authenticate to the directory, then he has the ability to download its own PSE. But in order to authenticate, he needs a password provided during registration. Therefore only the intended user can access his PSE.
To enforce this, the CA has to choose special ACLs. Only the authenticated users must have read access to the userPKCS12 attribute of their own entry, while all others should have no privileges at all. Downloading the PSE is performed with integrity and confidentiality due to the TLS connection.
We have implemented both schemes to provide a proof of concept. We have used the OpenLDAP [OpenLDAP] directory since it gives the possibility to create flexible ACLs and supports TLS and SASL. We have used JNDI [JNDI] at the CA and client side for the LDAP interfaces.
Usability issues
We believe that these two basic applications for user management with LDAP enhances the usability of the PKI. In the PoP case it is easier for a human user to decrypt a value than to provide his private key or to engage himself in challengeresponse procedures. Decrypting data like the certificate or the password is the intended usage of the decryption key and is already implemented in common client software. Furthermore, most client software comes with LDAP support to be able to fetch the certificates of others. These features can be easily extended and combined to automatically fetch the encrypted data from the directory, decrypt it and store the certificate back. Particularly, the last action can be totally transparent to the end-entity.
Also, fetching a PSE from the directory is essentially the same as looking up certificates of others. Thus, no extra development needs to be done for the client software. The usability is increased by the fact, that the client can transparently download the PKCS#12 file and integrate the contained private key at the client side 8 . Instead, if the user has received his PSE by e-mail or floppy disc, he would have to install it somehow manually. Furthermore, only the LDAP connection has to be configured at the client and nothing else. Depending on the CA's policy, also the following strategy may be chosen: The software PSE may additionally remain on the directory to serve as backup. Moreover, it can be available from everywhere. For this, client software could be configured to download and use the PSE on demand without mandatory storing it locally.
Conclusion
We have presented two schemes for providing proof-of-possession and secure delivery of personal security environments. Both schemes use an LDAP directory which is already integrated in most PKIs, it is ideal for user management, it has sufficient security features and many existent clients have already LDAP interfaces which can be extended. We plan to integrate our proposed solutions into an upcoming PKI installation at the University of Darmstadt. Future work will concentrate on extending the use of LDAP in PKIs for other administration and certificate management tasks like certificate revocation and certificate renewal.
